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52D CONGRESS,}

SENATE.

~Ex.

Doc.

) No. 63.

1st Session.

IN THE -SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

LETTER
FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
IN RESPONSE TO

Senate

resol~(;tion

of March 16, 1892, relative to th~ title by which the
Cherokee Nation hold the Cherokee Outlet.

MARCH

21, 1892.-Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs antl ordcreu to be
printed.

DEPARTl\IENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, llfarch 17, 1892.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Senate resolulution of the 16th instant in tlw following words:
Resolvecl, 'l'hat the Secretary of the Interior be directed to transmit to the Senate a
copy of his letter of February 13, 1891, to Hon. I. S. Struble, chairman of the Committee on Territories of the Honse of Representatives of the Fifty-first Congress,
upon the natnre of the title by which the Cherokee Nation hold the Cherokee Outlet, and of the report thereon by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated January
26, 1892, both of w bicb are referrerl to in the opinion of February 25, 1892, by the
Assistant Attorney-General for the Interior Department, upon the legality of the
agreement between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, providing for the
('ession of the Cherokee Outlet to the United States.
·

In response thereto I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of
the pa]>ers called for.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
JOHN w. NOBLE,
Secretary.
The PRESIDEN'l.' OF 'l'HE SENATE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, February 13, 1891.
SIR: On January 17, 18Dl, Mr. Mansur introduced in the House of
Represenbttives a bill which in effect proposed to appropriate $7,489,718.72, to pay the Cherokee Nation at the rate of $1.25 per acre, tor
any title, claim, or interest they might have to land within what is
k1town as the Uherokee Outlet. If the Cherokees upon due notice refuse to accept the provisions of said act, the President is authorized,
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within ninety days after ascertaining such refusal, by proclamation to
declare said outlet to be incorporated into and he a part of the Territory of Oklahoma, and subject to the laws thereof, and thereafter
said lands are to be opened to settlement under the homestead and
town-site laws on conditions prescribed.
This bill was referred to the Committee on Territories, and by you
inclosed to this Department with a request for my views as to the desirability for a favorable report on the measure and passage thereof hy
Congress at this session. On receipt of this r<'quest the matter was
inadvertently referred by the Assistant Secretary to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs; and herewith is sent a copy of the report of that
officer.
By way of premise the Commissioner :::;tates that no action of the
executive officers of the Government, nor the provisions of treaties
with the Cherokees prior to that of J\fay 6, 1828 (7 Stats., 311), have
any bearin~ upon the present status of the Cherokee Outlet. After referring to that and other treaties, and the citation of decisions supposed to be applicable to the questions involved, he arrives at the conclusion that up to the. date of the treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 StatR.,
7!l9), "the Cherokees had a full and complete fee-simple title to the
lands embraced in the Cherokee Ontlet."
He then considers the effect of the treaty of 1866, and concludes tbat
it does not cbange or modify the title to said lands, but simply gives
the United States the right to settle friendly Indians thereon to whom
the Cherokees were to sell at a price to be determined; and he holds, as
to such lands as have not been so sold, "they are absolutely r)rivate
property, in which the United States has no more interest than has a
State in private lands w hlch are liable to escheat." He has no doubt
that the appropriation of tl1is land in accordance with the provisions of
the bill, without the assent o.t the Cherokees, would be decided on appeal to the courts to be" illegal and void," and for the Government to
open the outlet in the manner proposed would be "to disregard its solemn obligations and violate its faith in order to accomplish that purpose."
The careful consideration which I have given to the subject does not
sustain the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner, for, in writing
to Gen. Fairchild, chairman of the Cherokee Commission, under date
of October 26, 1889, in relation to the purchase of the claim of the Inclians to this outlet, I said:
The United States mnst be sovereign within the limits of its own territory. It is
conscious of a purpose to wrong no one, and yet to allow its own people to expand
over the lana that is theirs; to give to the Indians of the Cherokee Nation an income
not only mof>t munificent, but permanent, for the outlet to which the Government
already has fee-simple title, snbjeet to the use its title intlicates, and upon which it
might settle adverse tribes without })aying the Cherokees therefor more than would
lH} due under appraisement already made than 47.49 cents per acre.

After reading the report of the Commissioner, examining the treaties
and decisions cited by him, and further consideration of the subject, I
~ee no reason for changing the views then expressed as to the title of
the Outlet. Therefore, in sending you a copy of his letter it seems
proper that the reasons which prevent me from coming to the same
conclusions should be stated; and also that the many errors of law and
fact into which the Commissioner has fallen should be pointed out.
It is not necessary in this connection to rehearse the well-known history of, and all the dealings of the United States with, the Cherokees.
It is sufficient to say that prior to 1817 all of the Cherokees resided
east of the l\1ississippi. By treaty of that year they ceded certain of
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their lands to the United States, and it was agreed that such of them
as would settle west of the Mississippi on the Arkansas River should
receive their due proportion, acre for acre, in exchange for the ceded
lands. The treaties were to continue in full force with those remaining
east as well as those going west of the l\iississippi. The Government
was anxious, for good reasons, to locate them altogether upon the Arkansas River, and many e.tforts were made to that end. In March,
1818, President Monroe wrote to the chief of the Arkansas branch as
follows:
It is my wish that you should have no limits to the west, so that you may have
good mill seats, plenty of game, and not be surrounded by the white people.

And on October 8, 1821, Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, under
whose charge the Indians were, wrote to the chiefs of the Arkansas
Cherokees as follows:
It is to be always understood that in removing the white settlers from Lovely's
purchase, for the purpose of giving the otttlet promised you to the west, you acquire
thereby no right to the soil, but rnercly to an outlet, of which you appear to be already
apprised, and that the Government reserres to itself the 1·ight of rnaking such disposition
as it may think proper with regm·d to the salt springs ttpon that tract of count1·y.

Then follows the treaty of May 2, 1828 (7 Stats., 311), in the preamble of which special reference is made to "the pledges given them by
the President of the United States and the Secretary of War of March,
1818, and 8th October, 1821, in regard to the outlet to the west, and as
may be seen by referring to the records of the War Department."
This shows that the Commissioner's statement, that "neither the
action of the executive officers of the Government, nor the provisions
of the treaties with the Cherokee Nation, concluded prior to the treaty
of May 6, 1828, have any bearing upon the status of the Cherokee Outlet," is erroneous. On the contrary, such executive action was the basis
of the treaty itself.
By section 2 of the treaty, the possession of 7,000,000 acres is guaranteed to the Cherokees forever by specified bounds, and
In addition to the 7,000,000 of acres thus provided for and bounded, the United
States further guarantee to the Cherokee Nation a perpetual outlet west, and a free
and unmolested use of aU the country lying west of the western boundary of the
above-described limits, and as far west as the sovereignty of the United States and
their right of soil extend.

This is the first grant of the outlet west, and it must be apparent that
at this time it was the pm·pose of the United States only to grant, and
the Cherokees expected only to get-in the language of Mr. Calhoun,
made a part of the treaty by reference-"no right to the soil, but
merely to an outlet;" a mere right to pass to and fi'om the domain
west, an easement or franchise only.
In cont5equence of the selection by the Creek Indians of a portion of
the lands of the Cherokees, on February 14, 1833 (7 Stats., 414), another treaty was made, whereby the lands of the Cherokees are again
defined, with the same provision as to the outlet; with, however, a reservation to the United States to permit other Indians to get salt thereon,
and the stipulation that letters patent are to be issued at-; soon as practicable "for the land hereby guaranteed."
By section 5 of this treaty it is said:
These articles of agreement and convention are to be considered supplementary to
the treaty, before mentioned, between the United States and the Cherokee Nation
west of the Mississippi, dated 6th of May, 1828, and not to vary the rights of the
parties to said treaty; and, further, that said treaty is inconsistent with the provisions of this treaty, now concluded, or these articl~s of convention and agreo:w.ent,
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It must be apparent that this treaty did not change what was before
an easement into a fee simple.
By a further treaty of December 29, 1835 (7 Stats., 478), in consideration of $5,000,000, the Cherokees ceded to the United States all their
lands east of the Mississippi.
In article 2 reference is made to the agreements in the two preceding
treaties to convey the 7,000,000 acres and the guarantee of the outlet in the same terms as theretofore; it is then agreed that, in conRi<leration of $500,000, the United States shall convey in fee Himplc to the
Cherokees an additional tract of land, amounting to 800,000 acres, part
of the Osage Reserve in Kansas, and sometimes known as the Neutral
Lanus. And by section 3 it was provided:
The Uniteu States also agree that the lanfls a hove cedcrl by the treaty of Fehrnary 14,1833, including the outlet, and those cedeu by this treaty, 8hall all be inclu<le<l
in one patent, executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the President of the
Uniteu StatPs, according to the provisions of the act of May 28, 1830.

The act of 1830 here referred to authorized the President to exehange
lands with the Indians residing east of the l\fississippi for lands we~t
thereof, and to issue to them. if they desire, a patent for the same; said
htuds to revert to the United States "if the Indim1s become extinct or
abandon the same."
On December 31, 1838, a patent was issued to the Cherokees, and
particular attention is called to its recitals:
Whereas by certain treaties made by the United States of America. with the
Cherokee Nation of Indians of the sixth of May, one thons:mfl eight huiHlrc<l :nul
twenty-eight; the fourteenth of February, one thousand eight hundred nwl thirtythree; and the twenty-ninth of December, one thousand eight hundretl aml thirtyfive, it was stipulated and agreed on the part of the Unite<l States that, in consi<leration of the promises made in the saicl treaties, respectively, the Unitecl Stntes
should guarantee, secure, ancl convey by patent to the said Cherokee Nation certain
tracts of land; the descriptions of which t.raets and the terms an<l CO]l(litions on
which they were to be conveyed are set forth in the secon(l and third artirlcs of the
treaty of tlJC twenty-ninth of December, one thousan<leight hundred and thu:ty-1ive,
iu the words following. (Col. 9, Records of Patents, G. L. 0., p. 34:.)

Then are quoted at length articles 2 and 3 of said treaty, followed by
a description of the tract of 7,000,000 acres and of the outlet as sur·
veyed, and also of the tract of 800,000 acres; then follows the granting
clause, which recites that "in execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in said several treaties," the United States give and
gTant to the Cherokee Nation the described land, to have and to hold
the same, ''with the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging to the said Cherokee Nation forever," ~mbject, however, to
the right reserved to permit other Indians to proeure salt, which has
been ascertained to be within the limits prescribed for ''the outlet
agreed to be granted;" "and subject also to all other rights reserved to
the United States in and by the articles hereinbefore recited, to the
extent and in the manner in which the said rights are so reserved;"
and subject also to the condition of reversion as provided by the act of
May 28, 1830, supra.
A.ll of these conditions and recitals are omitted from the Commissioner's report, except that referring to the act of l\lay 28, 1830.
It seems to me evident that it was not intended by the patent to convey to the Cherokees any other interest or estate in the outlet than
was originally given them. It is expressly stated to be made subject
to the reserved rights of the United States, to the extent and in the
manner reserved. What those reservations are is made plain by references and recitals. Article 2 of the treaty of 1835 is recited at
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length, and this on its face purports to be, anrl is, a recital from the
treaty of 1828 and of 1833 (supra,). This last treaty declares it is supplementary, and is not intended to vary the rights of the parties to the
former; aud that treaty shows the grant of the outlet to have been
made subject to the conditions stated by Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of
War, in his letter of October 8, 1821, where he declares the grant is
made upon the condition, which the Indians well understood, that they
arc to "acquire thereby no right to the soil, but merely an outlet."
So that, by all rules of construction, in contemplation of Jaw, the
letter of Mr. Calhoun is as much a part of the condition of the patent
as if it were spread at length therein, and it was not intended by the .
patent to attempt to convey to the Cherokees a larger estate than was
originally granted them.
But if such intention existed, the patent is ineffective to convey a
larger estate than was given by the grant. A patent is not a grant, it
is but evidence thereof; a muniment of title, and not the title itself. It
can not enlarge or change a grant, nor diminish it by its recitals; where
error i~ committed in its recitals, the patentee only takes the estate
originally granted. (E. N. lVIarsh, 5 L. D., 96; Gazzam v. Pldllips, 20
How., 372; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S., 69:3.)
1'he Commissioner seems to have bee~ mhded by the general terms in
whith the habendum clause of the patent is couched, and to have lost
sig-ht of the conditions of the original grant, which are iterated and reiterate<! in the several treaties, and finally so referred to in the patent so as to
make them part thereof. The guaranty was of "a perpetual outlet,"
and when the Government proceeded to give its deed for the same it
was very properly stated therein that the land was so granted Hforever."
This is very different from conveying a fee simple title. The fact that
the right of way or perpetual outlet was embraced in the same clause
and covered by the very language whereby the fee simple title to the
other two tracts was intended to be conveyed no more makes the easement a fee simple than that the converse would be true. Both titles
were in perpetuity, but of different degrres. In the one caRe the patent evidenced the fact that the ice simple title had vassed from the
United StateR, an<l in the other that the easement had passed while the
fee remained in the United States.
The case of Holden v. Joy (17 \Vall., 211), cited lJy tbe Commissioner to suRtain his views, iu no respect does so. The 800,000-acre
tract heretofore mentioned, and known as the Neutral Lands, having
been ceded by the Cllerokees to the United States to sell aud to hold in
trust the proceeds for them, the court was eonsidering only the title to
that particular tract, and held that the Indian title thereto was fee
simple. :Mention of or the slightest reference to the outlet is not made
throughout the decision. It is an entire misconception of its purport
on the part of the Commissioner to quote it as authority to sustain the
proposition that the title of the Indians to the outlet is a fee simple.
Even the citation made by him from the decision to support the proposition that the condition in the patent as to the abandonment by the
Indians was void does not sm;tain him, as that question was not
decided by the court, but was expressly reserved, as would have been
shown if he had quoted the remainder of the sentence.
The case of the United States 'D. Reese, in 5 Dill., 405, referred to by
him as in 8 Cent. L. J., throws no light on the subject. The question
there was whether the Indians had a fee simple title to lands within the
Cherokee Nation. The court so held, and discharged a party charged
with timLer trespass, under section 5388, Revised Statutes, upon the
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7,000,000-acre tract. The question of title to the outlet was not involved.
In the case of the United States v. Rogers (23 Fed. Rep., 657) Judge
Parker, after reading and quoting from the patent of December 31,
1838, says, the title of the Indians to the outlet is ''substantially the
same kind of a title" as that by which they held their other lands,
"the only difference being that the outlet is encumbered with the stipulation" that other Indians may be permitted to get salt thereon. He
maintained the jurisdiction of the district court of the western district
of Arkansas in the matter, and discharged the party charged with
arson for want of jurisdiction over the lands in the outlet which he
declared to be ''set apart and occupied" by the Cherokees. But in this
case the judge, in the examination leading up to his opinion on the question of title, satisfies himself by stating in a general way that the outlet was granted by the treaties, and then looks only to the patent to
see what was granted, and quotes from the descriptive and habendum
clauses thereof, and does not quote its recitals from the treaties.
This somewhat cursory examination of the question of title much
weakens the force of that decision. Besides, the question of the title
by which the Cherokees held the outlet, was not directly involved in
that case, as the learned judge says (p. 665):
By the treaties and patent above referred to the Cherokee Outlet was beyond question set apart to the Cherokees, and to that extent was in a condition the converse of
that which is necessary to attach it to the district of Kansas. It matters not what
may have been the extent of their title. If they had a title of any degree whatever,
it was set apart to them.

He then showed that it was "occupied" by the Cherokees, and therefore concluded that "it does not come within the designation of Indian
country not set apart and occupied by the Cherokees;" and upon that
ground discharged the prisoner.
In phe case of Wolf (27 Feel. Rep., p. 611 ), cited by the Commissioner,
the question was one of conspiracy to defraud the Cherokee Nation
out of certain moneys, and the same judge, in delivering his opinion,
referred to the Rogers case, just quoted, as determining that the
Indians had a fee-simple title to the outlet, though that question was
not directly involved in the case.
The Commissioner quotes the case of the United States v. Soule (30
Fed. Rep., 918) as deciding "that no dh•tinction was made in the
granting clause (treaty of 1833) between the 7,000,000-acre tract and
the outlet." In this he is mistaken. ~Judge (now l\lr. Justiee) Brewer,
of the United States Supreme Court, who delivered the opinion of the
United circuit court of the diRtrict of Kansas in that case, after referring to the proviso in the treaty of 1833 relative to the issue of letters
patent, then says:
In pnrsn::mce of this treaty, patent was issued for all the lands, including the outlet west. No distinction was made in the granting clause between the 7,000,000acre tract and the outlet west.

By ev ry r:ule of grammatical construction it is the granting clause
of the patent to which the judge here refers, an<l not the treaty of 1833,
as interpolated by the Commissioner.
In this last case the judge of the circuit court refers to and dissents
from the former decision of Judge Parker in the Rogers case, both on
the question of the jurisdiction of the district court of Arkansas over
the outlet and the estate of the Indians in the outlet. In passiug upon
this point Judge Brewer examines the character of that estate. Going
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back to the treaty of 1828, he traces the title down, and sums up his
conclusions as follows:
Manifestly Congress set apart that 7,000,000 acres as a home, and that was thereafter to be regarded as set apart and occupied, "because," as e:xpressell in the preamble of the treaty, "Congress was intent upon securing a permanent home." Beyond that the guaranty was of an outlet-not a territory for residence, but for
passage ground-over which the Cherokees might pass to all the unoccupied domains
west. But while the exclusive right to this outlet was guaranteed, while patent was
issued conveyiug this outlet, it was described and intended obviously as an outlet
and not as a home. So, whatever rights of property the Cherokees may have in this
outlet, jt was not territory set apart as a home, and is not territory within the language of the act of 1883, " set apart and occupied" by the Cherokee tribe.

This conflict between Judges Parker and Brewer (the latter presiding
in the higher court) must further weaken the force of the opinion of
the former.
In the Commissioner's letter it is remarked that in the fifth article of
the treaty of 1835 with the Cherokee Nation, the United ~tates covenanted and agreed that the lands ceded totbeCherokeeNation, including the 7,000,000 acres "and the outlet," shall at no future time, without their consent, be included in the territorial limits of any State or
Territory.
A different construction may be placed on this article. It is to the
effect that the United States "hereby covenant and agree that the lands
ceded to the Cherokee Nation in the foregoing article" shall not, without tlwir consent, be included, etc. The lan(ls here referred to are
those mentioned in the third article, I think, beyond any question.
That article says:
The United States also agree thnt the lands above cedell by the treaty of February
14-, 1833, including the outlet and those ceded by this treaty, shall be included in
one patent executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians, etc.

Congress did not seem to consider the outlet as being of the "ceded
lands," thf' plain intendment of that section being that the ceded lands
under both treaties, and also the right to the outlet-a mere easement. shall be included in one patent. But even if the intention was to desig11ate tl1e outlet as ceded lands, it by no means follow;s that a fee-simple
title passes by the cession, and under the doctrine of the Cherokee
Tobacco case (infra) and the act of March 3, 1871 (infra), the Government has a right to exercise sovereignty over said lands as it pleases.
I think there ought to be no doubt, on the review of the matter, in
concluding that the estate of tne Indians in the outlet is only an easement, which secures them a mere right to use and occupy it for specitie<l
plu'poses. Such a grant by the Government is not a peculiar or unusual
one, for in many treaties setting apart reservations as the home of certain tribes a provision is also inserted authorizing them to use for hunting purposes other tracts of land for an indefinite period.
By Article 10 of the Cherokee treaty of 1866 (14 Stats., 799), the Cherokees were guaranteed the right to sell products within their nation
witl10ut paying any tax thereon to the United States. By act of 1868
(15 Stats., 167) the United States levied a tax upon tobacco "produced
anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United States.''
A levy of the proper tax was made upon certain tobacco grown within
the Cherokee Nation, and the right to do so being contested, the question came before the Supreme Court of the United States, whose decision, sustaining the right of levying the tax under the statute as
against the exemption claimed under the treaty, will be fouud in the
case of "The Cherokee Tobacco" (11 Wallace, p. 617).
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The following clause was inserted in the Indian appropriation bill of
1\Iarch 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 566):
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided fnl'fhel', That nothing
herein contained Ahall be construed to invali<bte or impair the obligtttions of any
treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.

TlJis proviso took nothing from the force of the enactment and added
nothing to the strength of the treaty obligations in existenee. It simply
declared the law as the Supreme Court had repeatedly decided it to he.
No treaty obligations were to be impaired by the enactment itself.
Those obligations were to remain in unimpaired vigor, subject, however,
thereaJter, as they bad been theretofore, to the paramount right of the
political department of the Government to repeal them by Congressional
enactment whenever thought proper, a right incident to the sovereign
power of the Government aud essential to its existence. See the Chinese
exclusion case (130 U. S., 581, 600), and the cases therein cited. Also
see Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company (135 U.S.,
641, G33-G55.)

This act was afterwards referred to by the Supreme Court in the ca~e
of the United States v. Kagama (118 U. S., 375), and it will be seen
by readiug the deci~ions referred to that neither Congress nor the
Supreme Uonrt thought that the exercise of the right thus to legislate
was "to disregar<l its solemn obligations and violate its faith."
Sufficient has been said, I think, to show many errors of law and
fact in said report, and to sustain the views entertained by me. And
I rcgl'et that the Commissioner should have thought proper to charge
that those who differ from him in judgment are "disregarding solemn
obligations and violating plighted faith," instead of confining himself
to an expression of his views on the law and facts, as requested.
In eouclnsion, the Commissioner says that from the reports recently
received ii:om the Board of Commissi01iers appointed under the provisions of the Indian appropriation bill of :March 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 980,
100;'5), to negotiate for the cession of these landR, it is in<lirated that
the differences bet,veen them and the Cherokees may yet be reconcile(l,
and the United States acquire by consent of the lndianH a clear title
to said lands without having recourse to the proposed legislation. In
this I regret to say that he seems also to be mistaken. Recent communications from the Board of Commissioners show that negotiations
dudng the past year have been barren of results, if not entirely futile.
Propositions have been made by our Commissioners which were met by
.counter propositions, some of which were so extravagant and unheard. of in character that the Commissioners were compelled to decline all
discu~sions in relation to them. And now, after repeated effort to bring
about an amicable settlement of these matters, no agreement has been
reached, and the negotiations have come to an end. Whether they will
be renewed and with what results remains for the future to diselose.
So far as I can see we are now no nearer amicable arrangement than we
were at the beginning.
I therefore think, in view of what has been said, and of other considerations not necessary to press upon you now, that if Congress intends to open up the Cherokee strip to settlement, the measure proposed, or some similar law, should be speedily enacted.
Of course, the fo egoiug views must be taken to be applicable only to
the Cherokee Outlet, in which I believe the InJians have only an ease-

ment, which Congress has poW'er to declare at an
-OOmpensation for such interest.
Very respectfully,
Hon.I.S.STRUBLE,
·
Ohairman Oommittee on Territories, House of Representatives.

Outlet.
In vie of onr ititittt ;tio
I refr i d
publi
i cpnn.~~IUA'. .'""&- YtN~• lil\J~~~.:tJ~~~iiW!kl.~ilfl~(~olv i of the err,.-,-·.~....,.._,,_ ill~;~~~~~~
i made that tlie OQ
~i
errors of law and fact, it seems obltigi-.to!t,t:•up,..·
a fttrther discu sion of the subject in qllel!ltioln;.
If the office has fallen into errors of law .Q.nl~'.o" ''~"l!IP.T.+.'Jt.l~~·~
wUl be very glad to have such errors distinctly p()tntA!Id vu."'~~~~
ha no other desire than to state the case aecurately and
for~hity with both the law and the facts. If, how.ever, tba sta~teJQeJIU
the case, as presented by this office, is a correct one and OOCX)r<lS
both the law and the facts, I can not believe otherwise than tha,t
will welcome such a statement.
I am sure that personal considerations do not weigh with me in ' f':h .i a ·........,~
matter, and that my only purpose is to aDrive at suoh a conclusion
will stand the test of the most searching criticism and the final arbi
ment of the courts.
In my report, after giving the substance o the provisions of the
I stated that " nei~her the action of the executive officers of 'ttt.41H~".,
e'l1lment nor the proVI ions f the treaties with the Chos.·\I'A."o
concluded prior to he treaty of May 6, 1828 (7 Stats., 311
bea~ng upon the p'resent status of the Cherokee Outlet." 'l'h1"- • -tn:a.1t.A:::':
ment youTegard as erroneous. You quote :&om the letter of PrEisid~en1~i';
Monroe,. of ~areh, 1818, and that of the Secretary of War, of Ootober
1821, and say:
Then fallows the treaty of May 2, 1828 (7 Sta.ts., 311), in the :preamble of
speeial reference is made to "the pledges given tlieln by the Prestdent of --, ---~·
Sta and the &\cretary of Warz of. JJ.rch, 1818, and October 8, ,1821, in
outlet to the west, and as may oe seen en referring to the records of the
partm«mt."

Itt perba s immaterial, but reference to the statute
rules bf gr&nimatical COnstruction, the Clause last nurr~1'D~it-~ r~~~~
what loll
i~ and not tO the pledges referred to.. .1:
of'the: preamb1e from bicb the quotation ia taken l'~il~·: a.W: ftl):k'm'if!,

1

_.nd whe~ ~ ptes&nt location of the Chero>lik~~ees::~in!t!:::::~J=~~:~~=~~

to tli~ir preae :t repose, and tending, ,as the past d4
dation antf mi8eryJ an,d the Che:rolieeS being an.xiGUS to &'fold a•lh' ~~eq'ii8nc:~:-~il:j;;~
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yet not questioning their right to their lands in Arkansas as secured to them by
::nHl resting also upon the pledges given them by the President of the United
States and the Secretary of War, of March, 1818, and 8th of Octoher, 1821, in regard to
the outlet to the west, and as may be seen on referring to the records of the \Var Department, still being anxious to secure a permanent home, and to free themselves and
their posterity from an embarrassing connection with the Territory of Arkansas and
guard themselves from such connections in the future.
treat~',

It will be seen that the letters of the President and Secretary are not
referred to as on record in the War Department. What "may be seen
on referring to the records of the War Department" is that the Cherokees are still "anxious to secure a permanent homr," etc.
It is to be further remarked that the" outlet" r• ferred to by Mr. Calhoun is not the "outlet" nuder disc,Jssion, but au other oue embracing
a mucl1 larger extent of country. (See "'l'he Cherokee Nation of Indians," by C. C. Royce, p. 246 and map No. 9. Also, second article of
treaty of 1833.)
·
You quote from subsequent treaties and thf' patent, and conclude
that the treaty shows the grant of the outlet to have been made subject
to the conditions stated by 1\ir. Calhoun, that l>y all rules of construction in contemplation of law, the letter of Mr. Calhoun is as much a
part of the condition of the patent as if it were spread at length therein,
and that it was not intended by the patent to attempt to c nyey to the
Cherokees a larger estate than was originally granted them.
I can not reach the conclusion that the declaration of :1\Ir. Calhoun
that "you acquire thereby no right to the soil, but merely to an outlet,''
etc., was made a part of the original grant.
It is not referred to in the body of the treaty as limiting, (·ontroWng,
or defining the title or estate to be conveyed. It is fonnd in the preamble, which recites the object of the parties in making the treaty and
the reasons moving them thereto. The grantor does not refer to it, but
the Cherokees give it as one of these reasons.
According to Bouvier, "In the interpretation of a statute, though
resort may be had to the preamble, it can not limit or control the express provisions of the statute." The grant of the Outlet and other
lands was made by the second article of the treaty, which contains no
reference to these pledges, and in construing the grant the courts do
11ot appear to have found it necessary to refer to the preamble. But if
we are to look outside of tbe several treaties and pat(\nts, then declarations made contemporaneously with the treaty of 18:)5, and witl1 direct
reference to the present outlet, 'vonld seem to be entitled to mneh
greater consideration than tlw statement made by Secretary Calhoun
with reference to another outlet seven years before the firHt treaty reln,ting to these lands was conclu(led.
Ma.rch 14, 1835, articles of a treaty were agreed upon iu this city by
J. F. Schermerhorn, on tbe part of the United States, and a delegation
of Cherokee Indians, which treaty (according to the title page of the
printed articles) "by the President of the United States, is directed to
be submitted to the Cherokee Nation of Indians for their consideration
and approbation." This provisional _treaty is substantially the sa,me
as that concluded at New J3Jcbota; Deceml>er 2U, 1835 (7 Stats., 478).
In a memormHlum prepared by the Seeretary of War, lion. Lewis
Cass, and delivered to Senator King, of Georgia, Fel>ruary 28,1835, referring to the two delegations of Eastern Cherokees then in the city,
one headed by John Ross and the other by .John Ridge, he states that
the discussion between the latter and 1\Ir. Schermerhorn on the part of
the Government have terminated in a general understanding respect-
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ing the basis of the arrangements.
considerations and says:

11

He then refers to the pecuniary

Besides these pecuniary stipulations a tract of very valuable land, estimated to contain about 800,000 acres west of the Mississippi, is to be added to the territory already
possessed by them. This territory originally contained about 7,000,000 acres, in
audition to which they were entitled to the use of another tract containing about
6,000,000 acres for the purpose of an outlet or communication with the tribes and
country west of them. It is proposed in the arrangement with Ridge and his party
to grant them the entire p1·operty of this tract of 6,oou,ooo acres fm· their 11nconditional
use; this will make, for the whole country given and proposed to be given to them
west of the Mississippi, 13,800,000 'teres ofland. (Senate Ex. Doc. 120, Twenty-fifth
Congress, second session, p. 98.)

The italics are mine.
The Secretary thus indicates with clearness and beyond the possibility of mistake that whatever the intention had been under the pre.vions treaties it had now been determined to vest the "entire property"
of the Outlet in the Cherokees. It will be noticed that this declaration
was made before the provisional treaty had been signed by the parties
thereto. This memorandum, as is stated therein, bad been previously
submitted to the President and the course there indicated had been
approyed by him.
March 16, 1835, President Jackson addressed a communication to
the Cherokee delegation in which he refers to the treaty just concluded
(which was to be void unless approved ·by the Cherokee people) and
says:
I shall in the course of a short time appoint commissioners for the purpose of meeting the whole llOdy of your Jleople in council. They will explain to you more fully
my views and the nature of the stipulations which are offered to you.
These stipulations provide(1) For an addition to the country already assigned to you west of the Mississippi,
and for the conveyance of the whole of it by.pateut i11 fee simple. " " "
There are few separate communities whose property, if divided, would give to the
persons comprising them such an amonut.
It is enough to establish you all in the most comfortable manner; a11d it is to be
ohserved that besides this there are thirteen millions of acl'es conre.lJcd to the Western
Cherokees and yourselves by former treaties, and which are destined for your and
their permane11t residrnce. So that your whole country west of the Mississippi will
contain not less than thirteen millions eight hundred thousand acres.

The italics are mine.
This is not only a contemporaneous declaration by one of the contracting parties as to the 11ature of the estate promised in the new
treaty, but an interpretation by the hig-hest executive officer of what
l1ad been conveyed to them by former treaties.
·
If the Jetter of Mr. Calhoun "is as much a part of the condition of
tl1e patent as if it were spread at length therein," why is not the solemn
declaration of the President that the Outlet lands (which must be included to make the 13,800,000 acres) are destined for their permanent
residence, although not incorporated in the preamble, as much a part
of the condition of the patent as though it were spread at length therein;
and if so, why does not the latter declaration (not to mention its higher
authority) supersede and override the former~
Again, in a report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated
Augu~.;t 3, 1835, Mr. Schermerhorn, who was endeavoring to secure the
ratification by the Cherokees of the treaty of 1835, quotes an address
made by him in council on July 20, 1835, in which he makes the following statement (Senate Ex. Doc. 120, Twenty-fifth CongTess, second session, p. 456) :
Articles 2 and 3 declare that you are to have $4,500,000 in money, to be paid as
stipulated in the following articles, and 800,000 acres of land, in addition to the
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lands alrPndv secnrcd to the Cherokee Nation in the treaties with the Cherokees
weHt; :tll(l th;1 t this iH to lw in fnll of all yonr lanlls east of the Mississippi, and your
claims upon the Pnitc<l Statcs. The whole quantity of lands that you will now have
west secured by this and other treaties will be 13,800,000 acres, which is more than
all t.h e lands the whole Cherokee Nation owned before the treaty with Gen. Andrew
Jackson in 1817, by which they were to have acre fo1' acre for their lands east on the
west of the Mississippi. I say you will have more land than you had there; for by
that treaty you sold to the United States about 4,000,000 acres and you still own here
a hont 7,000,000 acres, making in all 11,000,000 acres, so that without t.he 800,000
ll!'l't'S whieh you buy by this treaty, yon will have 2,000,000 acres more west of the
MiHsissippi than yon bad here before the treaty of 1817. The fourth article declares
that all of your lands west shall be secured to yon by a patent deed from the Presi(Leut of the United States, and you will hold it by the same title the white man holds
his lands, as loug as you exist as a State and reside upon it.

I believe that I bave not fallen into error of law or fact in stating
thatNeither the action of the executive officers of the Government nor the provisions
ofthe treaties with the Cheroke~ Nation concluded prior to the treaty of May 6,
1828 (7 Sta.ts., 311), have any bea.rmg upon the present status of the Cherokee Outlet.

It muRt be remembered that the treaties of 1828 and 1833 had 'been
made with the "Western Cherokees" or those who had removed to the
west. llut notwithstanding all the efforts put forth by the GoYernment,
mlly a comparatively small portion of the Cherokees had so removed.
In a work entitled "The Cherokee Nation of Imlians, by Charles 0.
Hoyce,'' printed in an extract from the Ji'ifth Aunual Report of the Bul'e;m of Ethnology, Mr. Royce thus refers to the situation at this time
(p. 266):
Oeorgia refused to submit to the decision ("Worcester 1'8. State of Georgia, 6 Pet.,
G15) and alleged that the court possessed no right to pronounce it, she being by the

Constitution of the United States a ~lOvereign and independent State, and no' new
Stn te could he formed within her limits without her consent.
The President was thus placed between two :fires, Georgia demanding the force ot
l1is authority to protect her constitutional rights by refusing to enforce the decision
of the !'onrt, and the Cherokees dema.nding the maintenance of their rights as guarnnte('d them under the treaty of 1791, and sustained by the decision of the Supreme
Court.
It was manifest the request of both could not be complied with. If he assented to
the d<'sire of the Cherokees a civil war was likely to ensne with the Sta tc of Georgia.
If he did not enforce the decision and protect the Cherokees, the faith of the nation
would be violated. In this dilemma a treaty was looked upon as the only ~tltt'rua
tiYe, by which the Cherokees should relinquish to the United States all their interest
in lands east of the Mississippi and remove to the west of that river, and more earuest,
urgent, and persistent pressure than before was applied from this time forward to
compel their acquiescence in such a scheme.

ln view of this situation and of the positive declaration of Secretary
Cass and President Jackson we may not conclude that the treaty-making
power was willing to make further concessions as to lands as well as
moneys, and, as a result, that whatever had been the status of the Outlet under the treaties of 1828 and 1833, the fee was intended to be conveyed and actually was conveyed by the treaty of 1835, which stipulated
tlwt the Outlet should be included in a patent, to be issued under the
provisions of the act of 1830.
It is to be further observed that the treaties of 1828 and 1833 had
been made with the Western Cherokees, as before stated. These were
a small proportion of the Cherokee people, bad been resident in Arkansas, and were known as "hunters," '\Vhile the great ma~s of the
peOJ)le, resident in Georgia, Tennessee,. and the adjoining States, had
abandoned the bunter life. As was said by John Ross:
The willlcrness has given place to comfortable dwellings and cultivated fields,
stoeked with domestic animals. Mental culture, industrious habits, and domestic
enjoyments have succeeded the rudeness of the savage state.
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While to the former class an "outlet," over which they could roam
and hunt, would have been a valuable possession, it would have been
wholly useless to the latter class.
In the light of this contemporaneous evidence, not before me when I
prepared my previous report, I am inclined to believe that I would have
been justified in stating that it was unne<'essary to go back of the treaty
of 1835 and the negotiations attending it, to determine the status of
the Outlet.
In the treaty of August 6, 1846 (9 Stats., 871) made with the three
parties into which the Cherokees were divided, it is providedThat the lands now occupied by the Cherokee Nation shall be secured to the whole
CJ1erokee people for their common use and benefit; and a patent shaH be issne<l for
the same, including the eig-ht hundred thousand aeres purchased, together with the
outlet west promised by the United States, in conformity with the provisions relating thereto, contained in the third article of the treaty of eighteen hundred and
thirty-five, and in the third s<wtion of the act of Congress approved 1\fay twentyeighth, eighteen hundred and thirty, which authorizes the President of the United
States, in making exchanges of lan<ls with Indian tribes, to assnre tbe tribe or
nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever scenre
atHl guarantee to them and their heirs or successors the country so exchanged with
them; anll, if they prefer it, that the United States will cause a patent or grant to
be macle and executeu to them for the same: Provided always, That snch lands shall
revert to the United States if the Indians shall become extinct or shall abandon tho
same.

It will be observed that reference is made to the treaty of 1835 ouly,
and not to the treaties of 1828 and 1833.
I may remark in passing that the object in making this treaty of
1846 aud the stipulating for the issuance of a patent which had ah·eady
issued is set out in a recent opinion of the Court of Claims, iu the case
of the 'Vestern Cherokees:
That treaty was a <·ompact between three parties, tho Unite<l States, the Eash·rn,
an<l the Western Chero1(ees. Its purpose was to make the Eastern an<l the \Yestern
Cherokees parties to the treaty of New Echota, which they had never conceded themselves to be, and to secure peace in tho Cherokee country. The principle upon which
it is sought to accomplish this purpose was that on the ono hand the \Vestern Cherokees should participate in the purchase money which had been paid for the lands
east of the Mississippi, and on the other that they should abandon th<:'ir autonomy
and become suoject to the government which had been established by the Eastern
Cherokees.
The reason behind the principle was that in 1835 the Western Cherokees owned
the Cherokee country west and had paid for it, and that the Eastern Cherokees acquired, by the terms of the treaty of New Echota, two-thir<ls of this without paying
for it, and at the same time retained all of the purchase money which had been given
for their possession east of the Mississippi. A portion of this purchase mouey hacl
been expended for the use of the Eastern Cherokees, and a portion was held as a
trust for their benefit; the remainder had been paid to them per capita.
If their removal had been effected on the same terms as that of the \Vestern Cherokees under the treaty of 1828, thoy would have received land in the Indian Territory in exchange for land oast of the Mississippi.
As it was, they had received both land and money; but the lan(l was the land of
the Western Cherokees. Strictly, the Government should have paid the \Vestern
Cherokees for the lands thus appropriated, and should have deducted the price from
the money paid to the Eastern Cherokees. It was now sought by the treaty of 1846
to accomJ,lish this in an indirect way-the Western Cherokees were to be admittecl
ab initio to a quasi partnership or joint ownership by the terms of which they were
to contribute the laud in the Indian Territory and share in the proceeds of the laud
east of the Mississippi.

You cite authorities to show that a patent is not a grant, and state
that I appear to have been misled by the general terms in which the
habendum clause of the patent is couched, and to have lost sight of the
conditions of the original grant, which are iterated and reiterated in
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the several treaties, and so referred to in the patent as to make them
part thereof. You say:
The guaranty was of u a perpetual ont1et," and when the Government proceeded
to give its deed for the same, it was very properly stated therein that the land was
so granted "forever." This is very different from conveying a fee simple title. The
fact that the right of way or perpetual outlet was embraced in the same clause and
covered by the very language whereby the fee simple title to the other two tracts
was intended. to be conveyed, no more makes the easement a fee simple than the converse would be true. Both titles were in perpetuity, but of different degrees. In
the one case the patent evidenced the fact that the fee simple title had passed from
the United States, and in the other that the easement had passed, while the fee remained in the United States.

It is true that a patent is not a grant, but evidence thereof. It is,
however, ''the highest evidence of title and is conclusive as against the
Government and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is
set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal." (United States 1.'.
Stone, 2 Wall., 525.) It is, moreover, conclusive evidence of title.
(Gibson v. Choteau, 13 Wall., 92.) The recitals in a patent are conclusive. (Crews v. Bareham, 1 Black, 352.)
But let us see if I was misled by the habendum clause. The patent
refers to the treaties of 1828, 1833, and 1835, by which "it was stipulated and agreed on the part of the United States that in consideration
of the promises mentioned in said treaties, respectively, the United
States should guarantee, secure, and convey by patent to the said
Cherokee Nation certain tracts of land." It quotes the whole of the
second and third articles of the treaty of 1835. In passing, allow me
to remark that the second article contains the following significant
clause:
Proddecl, ltowerer, That if the Saline or Salt Plain on the western prairie shall fa11
within said limits prescribed for said outlet, the right is 1:eserved to the Unite(l
States to permit other tribes of red men to get salt on said plain in common with
the Cherokees.

This is also contained in the treaty of 1833.
If the Cherokees were to receive only an easement and the fee remained in the United States, where was the necessity for the United
States to reserve the right to a1low other Indians to get salt, which right
could alone exist in the owner of the fee~ Moreover, the clause is a
recognition of the right of the Cherokees to get salt, which they would
not have if their interest was only an easement.
The third article of the treaty contains the following provision:
The United States also agree that the lands above ceded by the treaty of February
fourteenth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, including the outlet and
those ceded by this treaty, shall a.ll be included in one patent, executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the President of the United States, according to the provisions of the act of May twenty-eighth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty.

It will be observed that the second article refers to the previous
treaties, by the way of recital, to explain the reasons for the additional
grant of 800,000 acres.
The third article, however, is an independent propositwn, without
recital or preamble, by which the United States agrees that the lands
ceded by previous treaties, including the outlet and those ceded by
this treaty, should be included in one patent, to be executed according
to the provisions of the act of 1830 (4 Stats., 411). Under the provisions of that act the President was authorized to exchange lands
claimed and occupied within the limits of the States or Territories for
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districts of lands, to be laid off and described, in the territory west of
the 1\fississippi. It was made lawfhl in making any such exchangeFor the President solemnly to assnre the tribe or nation with which the exchange
is made that the United Stntes will forever ~e(·m·e and guarantee to them, :uul their
heirs and ~uceessors, the country so exehanged with them; and if they prefer it,
that.the United States will cause a 1)atent or grant to be made and executed for the
same.

Under tlus act, as before r;een, the President solemnly assm;ed the
Cherokees that the whole of the country asHigned to them should be
conveyed to them by patent in fee simple. a11d that this "country" included the outlet is shown by the quantity of land specified, and which
was destined for their permanent 'residence.
'fhe patent further recites that the United States have caused the
said tract of 7,ooo,ooo aeres, together with the perpetual outlet, to be
surveyed in one tract, the boundaries of which are described with full
particularity, containing 13,57,1,135.14 aereR. It further recites that the
United States have caused the tract of 800,000 acres to be surveyed,
and describes the boundaries thereof.
The granting clause is as follows:
Therefore, in execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in said several trcatie.·, tho United StatcH have given and granted, and hy these presents do
give and grant nnto the sai<l Ulwrokcc Nation the two tracts of land, so surveyed
and horeiul>cforc described; contai11ing, etc.

Then follows the habendum:
To have and to hold tho same, together with all tho rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said Cherokee Nation forever,

subject to th<> "aline stipulation, and subject to all other rights reserve(l to the Unitefl States; alHo to the condition of the act of l\1ay
28, 18:30, a.-; to abau.donmeut, ete.
If I understand yon correctly you would interpret the habendum as
follows:
•
To ha.ve aud to hold 7,000,000 aeres of oaid first-described tract and the tract of
800,000 acres as a horne, alHl the resi<lne of snirl tirst-describcd tract as a perpetual
outlet, together with all the rights, prl vilegcs, etc.

If this is the true meaning, I must collfess that I have been "misled
by the general terms in whieh the habendum clause of the patent is
couched."
It may be remarked here that the weHtern bouuclary of the 7,000,000
acres has never been a.:::;ccrtained, and no man knowH to this day where
the "home" ceases and tlle "outlet" begins. Uertain it is that a portion of the lands west of 9G 0 commonly regarded as constituting the
outlet are a paet of the home, for the Cherokee country without any of
these lands comprises but 5,031,351 acres. The distinction between
the home and the outlet appears to have been wholly obliterated by
the treaty of 1835.
Again, by the treaty of 1817 (7 Stats., 156) the Cherokees were to
have acre for acre for their lauch; east on the west of the lVIississippi.
According to Commissioner Schermerhorn they were entitled to 11,uoo,ooo
acres, or 4,000,000 acres more than the "home" contained.
You state that the case of llolden v. Joy (17 Wall., 211), cited by me
to sustuit1 my views, in no respect does so; that not the slightest reference to the outlet is matle throughout the dedsion; that it is an entire
miscon<'eption to quote it as authority to sustain the proposition that
the title of the Indians to the Outlet is a fee simple; and that even the
citation made to support the 11roposition that the condition in the
patent as to abaudolllUellt by the Indians was void, does not sustain

16

CHEROKEE OUTLET.

me, as that qnf'stion was not decided by the court, but was expressly
reserved, as would have been shown if I had quoted the remainder of
the sentence.
This case was not cited by me as conclusive of the title to the" Outlet," but it has always been regarded as the basis of all subsequent
deei~ions bearing upon Cherokee titles. It fixes the status of the tract
of 800,000 acres conveyed by the treaty of 183.).
It was quoted as showing the status of the title generally, and from
this basis I attempted to show the status of the "Outlet" by quoting
other decisions holding that the title to the latter was the same as to
the other lands.
You state that the citation made from that decision does not sustain
me, as the question was not decided by the court, but was expresRly reserved, as would have been shown if I had quoted the remainder of the
sentence. As to this I desire to remark that at the time the report
was prepared by this office it was not in possession of the Supreme
Court reports. I was therefore compelled to quote at second hand
from an Executive document (H. R. No. 54, Forty-seventh Congress,
second Hession).
The citation, moreover, precisely as given by me, appears in the
printeu instructions given the Cherokee Commission by my predecessor
and approved by yon (p. 10), and in the same connection. In fact, my
report was based largely upon these two papers. The sentence omitted
from the citation is: "but it is not.necessary .to decide that point, as it
is clear that if it is valid it is a condition subsequent which no one but
the grantor in this case can set up under any circumstances."
As the citation is given, however, not as a deciswn of a point, but as
an expression of opinion by the court, which is also apparent from the
language q noted, tho omission does not appear to be material.
'fhe case of the United States v. Reese (5 Dill., 403) you regard as
throwing no light on the subject.
"\Vhile it is true that the trespass with which Reese was charged
was committed upon tho 7,000,000-acre tract, the following language of
the eonrt is significant:
The C1wrukee Nation of Indians derived their title to their land:s from tho Unite<l
f\tates by grant. This grant is by v.irtne of different treaties matle between them
awl the United States. lly the second article of the tre:tty of May 6, 18:!8 (Hev.
Ind. Treat., 51), "the Unitetl States agrees to poHsess and gnara,ntee to the Cherokees,
jorercr, seven miLlion acres of l:1IHl, and this guarantee is hereby solemnly ple<lged."
Tltislaud i8 ll]uu·t of the country now occupied by them.

The italics, except the word "forever," are mine.
Tlte only other part of the conntey occupie1l by the Cherokees at that
time was the outlet. While the status of the 7,000,000-acre tract only
was in vol vetl in the ca~e, the words q noted strongly indicate that J ndgo
Parker recognizes no distinction as to the Htatus of the two tracts. This
. is clearly shown in the later case of United States v. Rogers (23 Fed.
Hep., 657). 'fhe case of Reese was quoted to show the nature of the
Uherokeo title generally, and as leading up to the case of Hogers. In
the latter case Judge Parker says:
By looking at the title of the Cherokees to their lands we find that they hold them
all by substantially the same kind of title, the only difference being that the ontlot
is incumhered with the stipulation that the United States is to permit other tribes
to get salt on the s~tlt plains. With this exception, the title of the Cherokee N~ttiou
to the outlet is just as fixed, certain, extensive, and perpetual as the title to any of
their lauds.

He thrn quotes from his derision in the Reese ease to show what the
mtture of that title is, concluding with the words: "Tb.is in effect puts
all the estate in the Cherokee Nation."
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You say that Judge Parker's somewhat cursory examination of the
question of title much weakens the force of his decision, inasmuch as
he" satisfies himself by stating in a general way that the Outlet was
granted by the treaties, and then looks only to the patent to see what
was granted, and quotes from the descriptive and habendum clauses
thereof, and does not quote its recitals from the treaties."
There is probably no officer of the Government, certainly no judicial
officer, who has had more occasion to investigate the question of the
Cherokee title, or who has given the matter more research than Judge
Parker. If he fails to quote any recitals from the patent or treaties, may
we not reasonably conclude that he did not consider such quotation
necessary~

You also say that the question of title by which the Cherokees hold
the Outlet was not directly involved in that case, as is shown by a quo·
tation from page 665.
In the case of Wolfe (27 Fed. Rep., 615), Judge Parker says:
This court held in United Sta,tes v. Rogers (23 Fed. Rep., 659), that the Cherokee
Indians hold what is called the Cherokee Outlet by substantially the same kind of
title it holds its other lands. The title to all its lands was obtained by grant from
the United States.

This case, you say, was one of conspiracy to defraud the Cherokee
Nation out of certain moneys, the question of title not being directly
involved. These moneys were the proceeds of the sales of lands within
the Outlet, the question discussed by Judge Parker being whether the
sum ($300,000) was an additional payment for lands already sold and
occupied under the ~dxteenth article of the treaty of 1866, or a payment
on account of unsold and unoccupied lands. He shows that the appraisement of these latter lands took away no rights from the Cherokees and gave none to the United States, uses the language above
quoted, and adds:
This principle puts the title fully and completely in the Cherokee Nation, and
lmtil it agrees to part with the same, it can not be taken from it. It has not yet
agreed to part with these lands except for a specific purpose. It seems to me
there need be but little trouble on the question of the title of the Cherokees to their
lands, if we but look at this title, and understand its true nature, and are prompted
by a sense of duty to do equal and exact justice to the Indians, and to give them that
full measure of justice which by law and good conscience belongs to them.

This may be an opinion on a point not directly before the court, but
it certainly "leaves but little doubt as to what the decision of that
court will be when the direct question arises there."
You refer to my quotation from United States v. Soule (30 Fed. Rep.,
918), "that no distinction was made in the granting clause (treaty of
1833) between the 7,000,000-acre tract and the Outlet," and state that
by all rules of grammatical construction, the judge refers to the granting clause of the patent and not to the treaty. It is true that the words
in brackets were interpolated; not, however, by me. The office not
being then supplied with the Federal Reporter, a quotation was taken
from the Congressional Record, where it appeared in a brief for the Cherokee Nation submitted by Mr. Baker. It is doubtless true that Judge
Brewer, by grammatical construction, refers to the granting clause of •
the patent, but as he does not remark that the patent attempts to con·
fer any g-reater estate than the treaty, the meaning conveyed appears
to be much the same.
In his opinion J ndge Brewer refers to Judge Parker's decision in
the Rogers case, and states that he is unable to yield to the force of his
reasoning, notwithstanding the consideration which its careful preparation compelled, because the geographical argument and the double
S. Ex. 63-2
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description "set apart and O<'cnpicd," led him to a different conclusion.
He held that it was set apart and,
douttless, in a certain sense, it was occupied because the Cherokee Nation had a title
and right to possess it; but if Congress had meant by this act to include all land
owned by the Cherokees, the 'vords "set apart" would have been ample and the
word 11 oceupied" was superfluous.
Bnt while the exclusive right to this outlet was guaranteed, while the patent was
issued conveying this outlet, it was described and intended obviously as an outlet
and not as a home. So whatever rights of property the Cherokees may have in this
outlet, it was not territory s0t apart for a home, and is not territory within the language of the act of 1883, '' set apart and occu1>ied" by t.he Cherokee tribe.

Judge Brewer virtually holds that the Cherokees " own" the Outlet.
In the case of the Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway
Company (33 Fed. Rep., 900), the nature of the Cherokee title is further
discussed.
This case involved the right of Congress to grant a right of way
through the Cherokee lands, the grant in question being through the
lands of the outlet. I make Lhe following extract from the syllabus
(by the court), omitting the head lines:
8. The title to all the lauds of the Cherokee Nation was obtained by grant from
the United States. This title is a base, flUalified, and determinable fcc, without the
right of reversion but o11ly the l)Ossibility of reversion, in the Unite<l States. This,
in efft'et, vnts all the t'Sta1e in the Cherokee Nation.
9. Congrt•ss cannot grant a right of way over the lands of the Cherokee Nation
without its consent, on the ground that the United States has title to such land. If
it can do so, it must be clone because the Government of the United States can exercise, with reference to the lands of the Cherokee Nation, the right of eminent domain.
10. The Cherokee Nation, while it owns the soil of its country, is under the political control of the United States, and it is dependent on it for its political rights.
This, as the history of this country has so often demonstrated, is necessary for the
protection of its people.

In reaching these conclusions the court refers to what it held in
United States v. Hee~e and United States v. Rogers, and says:
This is in suhstanee tho principle declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Holden r . .Joy.

This case waR taken to the Supreme Court on appeal, where it was
held that the Cherokee Nation wa~ not sovereign in the sense that the
United States, or a State, is sovereig·n, but is now, as heretofore, a dependent political community, subject to the paramount authority of
the United States. The court said:
The fact that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands in fee simple under patents
from the United States, is of no consequence in the present discussion, for the United
States may exercise the right of eminent domain, even within the limits of the several States, for the purposes necessary to the execution of the powers granted to the
General Government by the Constitution.
*
The lands in the Cherokee Territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within the gPographicallimits of the United States, are held subject to the
authority of the General Government, to take them for such ohjects as are germane
to the ext'Cution of the powert> grante<l to it ; provided only that they a.re not taken
witlwut just compensation being made to the owner. (135 U. S., 64.1.)

•

There i~ no suggestion in the opinion as to the right of the U1lited
States to take these lands as a right of way on other ground than that
of eminent domain, and 110 intimation of dissent from the position of
the lower court as to the title and status of the Cherokees. There is,
in fact, a positive and unqualified admission that "the Cherokee N ation holds th se lands iu fee simple under patents from the United
States." The decree below dismissing the bill, because the relief asked
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for was both legal and equitable, was reversed in order that the case
might be tried de novo, and all the questions of law and fact that either
party chose to raise be finally determined. The court expressed some
doubt as to whether the reasons for their conclusion should be given,
and say:
But as the questions raised by the demurrer were elaborately examined by the
court below, and were fully discussed .a t the bar, and as the plaintiff ought not to be
led to snppose that a new bill in equity, based upon the alleged invalidity of the act
of July 4, 1884, would avail any good purpose, we have concluded to state the
grounds upon which we hold that Congress, in the passage of that act, has not violated any rights belonging to the plaintiff.

I do not claim that the passage first quoted amounts to an adjudication of the title to the Cherokee Outlet, but it is strongly indicative of
what the opinion of the court would be if the question were before it,
and it seems somewhat remarkable that in giving reasons for holding
that no rights of the Cherokees had been violated, the entire court, including Mr. Justice Brewer, should have overlooked the fact that these
lands actually belong to the United States, the right of the Cherokees
being a mere easement, if such be the case.
In my report I remarked that in the fifth article of the treaty of 1835
it was stipulated that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation, including the 7,000,000 acres and the outlet, should never be included
within the limits of any State or Territory without their consent.
The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee
Nation in the foregoing article shall in no future time, without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory. But
they shall secure to the Cherokee Nation the right by their national councils to make
and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government
and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to
their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them.

You state thatA different construction may be placed upon this article. It is to the effect that
tbe United States "hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee
Nation in the foregoing article" shall not, without their consent, be included, etc.
The lands here referred to are those mentioned in the third article, I think, beyond
any question.

You quote from that article and say:
Congress did not seem to consider the outlet as being of the "ceded lands," the plain
intendment of that section being that the ceded lands under both treaties, and also
the right to the ontlet-a mere casement-shall be included in one patent. But even
if the intention was to designate the outlet as ceded lands it by no means follows
that a fee-simple title passes by the cesRion, and under the doctrine of the Cherokee
Tobacco Case (infra) and the act of March 3, 1871 (infra), the Government has a
right to exercise sovereignty over said lands as it pleases.

You then give the substance of the Cherokee Tobacco Case (11 Wall.,
617).
I presume that by the reference to Congress the treaty-making power
is intended. As we have already seen, the President, by whom, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, treaties are made, solemnly assured the Cherokees, while seeking· their approval of this treaty, that
the country destined for their permanent residence, contained not less
than 13,800,000 acres, while Secretary Cass informed the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, with the approval of the President, that the
whole country given and proposed to be given contained 13,800,000
acres. Is it not clear that the lands which were not to be included
within the limits of any State or Territory without their consent, comprised their entire country of 13,800,000 acres?
This article was cited, not for the purpose of showing the nature of
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the title, but to show that the lands of the Outlet could not be opened
to settlement and included within the limits of a territory without the
consent of the Cherokees, and this would be equally true whether their
estate be in fee or merely an easement.
The sovereignty of the United S.tates over the lands of the Outlet,
and even over the 7,000,000-acre tract, together with the right of eminent domain, rs freely admitted, but sovereignty extend~ over lands
owned in fee simple as well as over lands belonging to the sovereign,
and eminent domain is exercised wholly over lands not owned by the
sovereign.
You refer to the Cherokee tobacco case, the Chinese exclusion case.
and Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company to show
that treaty obligations are subjectto the paramount right of the political department of the Government to repeal
them by Congressional enactment wheneve:r thought proper-a right incident to the
sovereign power of the Government aml essential to its existence.

The Cherokee tobacco case can hardly be considered as authority in
view of the following declaration of the Supreme Court in United States
v. Forty-three Gals. Whisky (108 U. S., 497).
The case ofthe Cherokee tobacco tax (11 'Vall., 616) can not be trcatetl as authority
against the conclnRion we have reached. The decision onl;v disposed of that case,
as three of the judges of the court did not sit in it, and two dissented from the
judgment of the other four.

· There can, however, be no question as to the existence of the right
referred to in cases·purely politicaL It is equally true that Congress
has no constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under
treaties, except in such cases. (See Holden v. Joy, 17 WaH., 247, and
authorities there cited.) This is distinctly recognized in the Chinese
exclusion act (130 U. S., 609).
Possibly the stipulation in the treaty excluding the country of the
Cherokees from the limits of any State or Territory without their consent is a purely political one, but it was doubtless one of the con'!3iderations that induced them to exchange their lands east of the Mississippi
for those in the Indian Territory. But even if Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate this provision of the treaty, would not
the exercise of the power be a violation of a solemn treaty stipulation~
The case of the Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kausas Ry. Co.
has already been referred to.
The case of the United States v. Kagama (118 U.S., 375), referred to
in the foregoing case, involved the political status of Indians generally.
The defendant was not a member of the tribe holding treaty relations.
A careful reading of tbe Chinese exclusion case and the Southern
Kansas Railway Company case has strengthened my belief that whatever may be the title of the Cherokees to the lands in the " Outlet,"
they can not be opened to public settlement without the consent of tlle
Cherokees.
The construction placed upon the rights of the Cherokees by the
treaty-making power and by Congress fully agrees with that adopted
by the courts.
By the sixteenth article of the treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 Stats., 804),
it was agreed thatThe United States may settle friendly Indians in any part of the Cherokee country
west of 96°, to be taken in a compact form in quantity not exceeding one hundred
and sixty acres for each member of each of said tribes thus to be settled, the boundaries of each of said clistricts to be distinctly marked, and the land conveyed in fee
simple to each of said tribes, to be held in common or by their members in severalty,
as the United States may decide.
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Said lands thus disposecl of to be paid for to the Cherokee Nation at such price as
may be agreed on between tho said parties in interest, subject to the approval of the
Presid'3nt; and if they should not agree, then the price to be fixed by the President.
The Cherokee Nation to retain the right of possession of an(l jurisdiction over all
of said country west of 96° of longitude. until thus sold and occupied, after which
their jurisdiction and right of possession to terminate forever as to each of said
districts thus sold and occupied.

It will be observed that the Cherokee Nation agrees to sell the lands
west of the ninety-sixth degree, an indefinite quantity of which were
lands included in the "Outlet," not to the United States but to friendly
Indians, payment to be made to the Cherokee Nation. This is certainly
a recognition of the nation's ownership of these lands. Again, the nation
is to retain jurisdiction and right of possession over unsold lauds. Can
it retain what it never possessed~
By a clause in the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stats., 624), Congress appropriated the sum of $300,000 out of funds due under appraisement
of Cherokee lands west of the Arkansas River, to be paid into the
treasury of the Cherokee Nation:
Provided, That the Cherokee Nation, through its proper authorities, shall execute
conveyances satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior to the United States in trust
only for the benefit of the Pawnees and other tribes now occupying said tract, as they
respectively occupy the same before the payment of said sum of money.

Now, if the Cherokees had only an easement or right of passage in
this tract, Congress required a party without interest to convey certain
lands to the owner of the fee, in trust for a third party.
And yet by deeds accepted as satisfactory by the Secretary of the
Interior, the Cherokees undertook to bargain, sell, remise, release, relinquish, and confirm uuto the United States, in trust, etc., certain
described tracts of land in the Outlet.
The sevent~enth article of the treaty of 1866 is, in part, as follows;
The Cherokee Nation hereby cedes, in trust to the Unite(l States, the tract ofland
in the State of Kansas which was sold to the Cherokees by the United States, under
the provisions of the second article of the treaty of 1835; and also that strip of land
ceded to the nation by the fourth article of said treaty which is included in the
State of Kansas, and the Cherokees consent that said lands may be included in the
limits of the said State.

The lands ceded were to be surveyed, and appraised by two disinterested persons, one to be designated by the Cherokee national council
and one by the Secretary of the Interior, a third to be selected by the
two appraisers in case of disagreement, the appraisement to be not less
than an average of $1.25 per acre, exclusive of improvements.
The first of the tracts referred to is the 800,000-acre tract, or Cherokee neutral lands, and the second tract is a narrow strip of the Outlet
lands, being that portion of the Outlet lying in Kansas, and sometimes
called the Ollerokee Strip. (The description, "Oeded to the nation by
the fourth article," is erroneous, as no cession or transfer was made by
the fourth article of the treaty of 1835.) (It is noticeable that the reference is to the treaty of 1835 and not that of 1828 or of 1833.)
The seventeenth articJe throws much light upon the status of the
Outlet in two or three important particulars:
(1) The same words of transfer are used as to each of the two tracts,
''The Cherokee Nation hereby ce£1es, in trust to the United States,"
the tract which was sold to the Cherokees, "and also that strip of the
land ceded to the nation," etc. According to Bouvier the word "cede"
means "to assign; to transfer; applied to the act by which one state
or nation transfers territory to another." The highest words of transfer
are used as to both tracts.
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(2) The Cherokees consent that "said lands" (these words refer un·
doubte<lly to both trarts; they certai11ly include the one last named)
may be iududed in the limits and jurisdiction of the State of Kansas,
thus showing conclusively that the treaty-making power understood
the stipulation of the fifth article of the treaty of 1835 to include the
lands of the Outlet.
(3) The lands in both tracts are to be surveyed, appraised, and sold
in the same manner (except that the neutral lands nwy be sold in one
body).
May 11, 1872, Congress passed an act "to carry out certain provisions of the Cherokee treaty of 1866, and for relief of settlers on the
Cherokee lands in the State of Kansas." (17 Stats., 98.) The preamble
of this act is as follows:
Whereas in order that certain provisions of the treaty of Jnly nineteenth, eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, between the United States and the Cherokee Nation may be
rendered clearer, and made more satisfactory to settlers upon the lands known as the
"Cherokee Strip/' in the State of Kansas, said settlers having moved thereon since the
date of said treaty, and for the purpose of facilitating the sale of said lands.

The first section provides "that the strip of land lying west of the
Neosho River, and included in the State of Kansas, cont,cyed to the
Cherokee Nation of Indians by the United States, and now belonqing
to scticl nation, shall be surveyed under the direction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office." (The italics are mine.)
This is a declaration by Congress tllat the land in the outlet was
"conveyed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the United States,"
nnd that the portion thereof lying in the State of Kansas then belonging to said nation, 110twithstanding the fact that the same had been
ceded to the United States in trust by the seventeenth article of the
treaty of 1866. It also provides for offering the lauds for sale, giving
settlers the right to enter and purchase lands occupied by them.
The third section provides that any Cherokee citizen, who had rights
under the Cherokee laws to any portion of said lands, and whose titles
were valid at the d.ate of the treaty of 1866, shall receive the proceeds
of the sale of such identical land, not exceeding 160 acres, instead of
their being invested as provided in section four. This recognizes the
right of a Cherokee citizen, prior to the treaty of 1866, to settle upon
lands in the "outlet" and acquire title thereto under Cherokee laws.
The fifth section provide:::; thftt the sale of the lauds nuder the act
shall not take place until the provisions of the act shall be accepted by
the Cherokee national council, or by a delegation duly authorized.
Can these provisions of the treaty of 1866 and the two acts referred
to be reconciled with the theory that the United States never parted
with the fee to the outlet lands, and that the Cherokees never had more
ti1an an easement which secured to them a mere right to use and occupy it for specified purposes~
It has been held by the Department that the outlet lands can be disposed of only as p1·ovided in .the treaty of 1866. In a letter to the
President dated February 28, 1882, Secretary Kirkwood says:
'£he Cherokees, by that treaty, ceded certain lands to the United States for a specific pu.rpose, to wit, the settlement thereon of ot.her tribes of friendly Indians, and
the Umted States took the lands for that purpose and can use them for that purpose
only. * * * (House Ex. Doc. No. 89, Forty-seventh Congress, first session.

In a letter to the president pro tempore of the Senate, dated January
3, 1885, Secretary Teller said:
The Cherokees have a fee-simple title to their lands, and they do not recognize the
right of the Department to interfere in the management of their atl'airs with reference thereto. (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, Forty-eighth Congress, second session,)
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The subject under discussion was the leasing of the Outlet lands.
But as regards the right of Congress to open these lands to settlement without the consent of the Cherokees, it seems to me that it is
wholly immaterial whether they hold a complete estate in fee to the
lands of the Outlet or only an easement or right of passage over.
In either case the guarantee is "forever" and "perpetual," and they
can no more, without their consent, be divested of the latter than of
the former.
Ag~in, Congress in the act of J\Iarch 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 980) authorized the a1)pointment of a Commission to negotiate with the Cherokees
for the cession of all their rights in theHe lands upon the same terms
as to payment as was provided for in the agreement with the Creeks.
Ha.ving attempted to a.equire the rights of the Cherokees, whatever
they may be, Congress would seem to be estopped, after failure of negotiations, from proceeding on the theory that negotiations are unnecessary.
Yon regret that I should have thought proper to charge that those
who differ with me in judgment "are disregarding solemn obligations
and violating plighted faith," instead of confining myself to an expres·
sion of my views on the law and facts as requested. The language nsed
by me is as follows:
But in my opinion this Government can not afford to disrcgar(l its solemn obligations and violate its faith in order to accompliRh that purpose.

I made no charges against anyone, but ~.;imply expressed my own
opinion as to the method propoHed by the bill. I question the motives
of no one in this matter, and have no reason to suppm;;e that any of the
advocate;:; of the bill are actuated by other than honest motives, or that
they do not conscientiously believe in the absolute equity of the measures proposed.
I have endeavored to state as clearly as possible the reasons which
lead me to oppose any measure looking to the acquisition of these lands
without the consent of the Cherokees, and to show that my report of
February 4, 1891, does not contain "many errors of law and fact." I
regret that I am compelled to differ with you in this matter, but I am
unable to reach any other conclusion than that expressed in my fol'mer
report.
.
fn eoncluding my report I expressed the belief that the differences
between the Cherokees and the Cherokee Commission might be reconciled and the Unites States aeqnire, by consent of the Indians, a clear
title to the lands without having recourse to the proposed legislation.
As the Commission have sncceded in reaehing an agreement with
Commissioners representing the Cherokee Nation, which agrooment has
been ratified by the Cherokee N atioual Conneil, and is now before this
office for consideration, the result has vindicated my judgment in this
respect.
In connection with this subject it seems JWOper that I should refer to
the decision of Judge Green in the Logan distl'iet eourt of the Territory
of Oklahoma, in the case of J. II. Jordan et (tl. v. llenry J. Goldman.
In this case the complainants, clai¥ ing to be Cherokee citizens, and as
such entitled to farm lands and to operate a stone qua.Try on the Cherokee
Outlet, filed their bill for an injunction against the defendant, who as
an Army officer, was, under the proclamation of the President, dated
February 17, 1890, and certain orders of the War Department, ejecting
cattle and persons from the Cherokee Out1et, and was about to eject
the complainants with their property and close up the quarry. Judge
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G reeu quotes from several treaties with the Cherokee Nation, the patent
ro1Jveying- the lands of the outlet to said Nation, and from the cases of
lloldcn L'. Joy, Uuited States v. Reese, United States v. Rogers, and
United States v. Soule, and concludes that the Cherokee Outlet was
ceded and granted by the United States and accepted by the Cherokee
Nation for the purpose of, and to be used as, an outlet only, and was so
understood by both parties to the treaties and patent. He says:
It is contrnded on behalf of tl1e complainants and alleged in their bill of complaint that the Cherokee Nation is the owner of the Cherokee Outlet in fcc simple,
and, in behalf of the defendant, that their only interest is a mere easement and that
the fee of the lands is in the Umte<l States. It is clear, however, upon principle and
authority, that neither one of the~:~e positions is tenable, and that the estate of the
Cherokee Nntion is a base, qualified, or determinable fee, and that, too, whether we
reject or retain the condition in the patent, that the lands shall revert to the United
States, if the Cherokee Nation shall abandon the same.

He discusses the character of this kind of an estate, and holds that
as the Cherokee Nation could not lawfully and by right use any part
of the Cherokee Outlet for the purpose of quarrying, selling·, and shipping the stone found thereon, it could not by license authorize the complainants in the suit to operate a stone quarry and to sell and ship the
stone. He then refers to article 16 of the treaty of 1886 and holds that
the rights of the Cherokee Nation in the use of the Outlet are not enlarged thereby. He further holds as follows:
If the Cherokee Nation has ceased to use the Outlet as an outlet, the cesser of the
use hud termiuated their estate, and the lands have ?'ct·erted to the United States,
bnt whether there has been a ces8CJ' of the use is rather a political than a judicial
question, which r-;houlll be settled by Congress and the chief executive of the nation,
aiHl if the lands base been abando•ed as an outlet, and snbjectcd to other uses by tho
Cherokee Nation, or with their consent ancl by their authority, their estate has
terminated and they have reverted to the United States·.
·

This decision substantially maintains that the estate of the Outlet is
in the Cherokee Nation, but that such estate is less than a fee simple,
being a fee 'Yith the condition subsequent attached by opei·ation of law.
Accepting his position as correct, the grantor could no more divest the
grantee of his title in the Outlet than it could if he held fee simple title,
except upon the breach of the condition. He, however, introduces a
new element into the discussion by suggesting that if the Cherokee
Nation has ceased tv use the Outlet as an outlet, such cesser has terminated their estate, and the lands have reverted to the United States,
which question, he says, is rather a political than a judicial one.
In the course of his opinion, Judge Green says:
And as to the seven million acres, the Supreme Court of the United States in the
caRe of The Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway Co. (135 U. S., 656), concedes that
the Cherokee Nation holds the same in fee simple. The Court there says: ''The
fact that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands, in fee simple, under patents from
the United States, is of no consequence in the present discussion."

He quotes other cases, and says:
\Vhat was said in these case-s, however, was said with 1·eferenco to the estate of
the Cherokee Nation in the permanent home lands, being the 7,000,000 acres, and the
800,000 acres,and did not refer to the estate of the Cherokee Nation in the Cherokee
Outlet.

In this statement Judge Green has fallen into an error wllich is of
great significance. He admits that the Supreme Court has conceded
that the Cherokee Nation holds the "home" in fe.e simple, and proeeeds
to draw a distinction as to the "outlet." The conclusion seems to be
almost irresistible that if he had known that the utterance of the Supreme
Court which he quotes·:had exclusive reference to the "outlet" (as is the
fact), he would have been compelled to decide that the Cherokee Nation
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holds the" outlet" in fee simple. tludge Green's 1aw is therefore based
upon an" error of fact" which dest.r oys the force of his reasoning.
I have also read the opinion of the Kingfisher district court of Oklahoma in the case of Jacob Guthrie v. Capt. William P. Hall, which involves substantially the same questions as the Jlreceding case. An
oral opinion was rendered by Judge Seay in which he holds that the
title to the perpetual outlet west "is a mere easement, a use, subject to
forfeiture in case the Cherokee Nation becomes extinct or abandons the
outlet." He then holds that the nation bas abandoned the outlet by
the voluntary sale and conveyance of some 2,000,000 acres to the Osage
and other Indians. This opinion and that of Judge Green are directly
in conflict as to the nature of the estate of the Cherokee Nation in the
outlet. Judge Green also holds that the fact of the abandonment is
rather a l)Olitical than a judicial question, while Judge Seay decides it.
So far as I am aware, the question of the abandonment of the outlet by
the Cherokees has never before been raised. The fact that the treaty
of 1866 gave to the United States the right to settle friendly Indians
west of the ninety-sixth degree, and the further fact that the United
States has settled a large numb~r of Indians on what may possibly be
the eastern part of the "outlet," can not, I think, be held to constitute
an abandonment of the unoccupied lands of the "outlet," for the treaty
of 1866 distinctly continues the right of JlOSession and jurisdiction over
all the lands west of the ninety-sixth degree until sold and occupied.
It was manifestly not the intention of this provision of the treaty to
divest the Cherokees of any rights in this country which they before
possessed, other than to secure to the United States the right to settle
ft·iendly Indians thereon, nor did it contemplate that the United States
could settle Indians on a narrow strip on the eastern end of these lands
and thereby forfeit the rights of the Cherokees in all the remaining
lands. The "outlet" is some ten townships in width, or sixty sections.
By locating sixty friendly Indians on contiguous forties, the United
States, under the opinion of Judge Seay, who appears to assume that
all of the lands west of the ninety-sixth degree are a part of the "outlet,"
could have caused an "abandonment" of the entire "outlet," except
the 9,600 acres required for these sixty Indians, which is hardly supposable. Besides, what becomes of the treaty stipulations that the
Cherokee Nation shall retain jurisdiction and right of possession over
all of said country until sold and occupied, after which their jurisdiction and right of possession to terminate forever as to each of said
districts thus sold and occ'ltpied.
These opinions of these lower courts seem to me to be so at variance
with judicial, legislative, and executive action and expres~ion, as well
as with each other, that they can hardly be regarded as authoritative
until confirmed by some higher court.
The courts have laid down rules by which we are to be governed in
construing Indian treaties. In the case of Worcester v. Georgia (6
Peters, 581), Mr. Justice McLean said:
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
preju.dice. If words be made use of which are suscepi;ible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should
be considered as used only in the latter sense. * * *" How the words of the
treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning,
should form the rule of construction.

This is affirmed in 5 "\Vall., 737. Again, in Choctaw Nation v. United
8tates (119 U. S., 1), the language is quoted, and the court adds:
The recognized relation between the parties to this controversy, therefore, is that
between a superior and an inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and
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ro11troJ of tlte former, :m<l wldclt, while it antlwrh<'s the adolltion on the part of the
l'11itrd States of SltdJ po]iry as their O\Vll 1mhlic intereHts may dictate :rt>cognizes, on
tlte othe1· ltand, such au interpretation of their acts aucl promises as justice mHl reasor.
ieman<l in all cases where power is exerted by the strong oYer those to whom they
owe care and protection. The parties are not on an equal footing, and that inequality is to be made good by the superior jnstice which looks only to the substance
of the right, without n'ganl to tedmical rules framed ll])(]er a system of municipal
,jnrispnH1cnce formulating the rights and obligations of private J1crsons equally
subject to the same laws

In United States v. Payue, (8 Fed Rep., 883), the court said as to the
treaty then under conRideration:
In construing the treaty we have a right to take into consideration the situation of the 1)arties to it at the time it was made, the J1rOpcrty wltil'l1 is the
snhject-matter of the treaty, and tho intention and purposes of the parties in making the treaty. To get at thiA intention we have a right. to consider the coustrnc-tion
tbe parties to the treaty, and who wel'e to be effected by it, have given it., mHl what
has been their action under it.

I think I have shown that the parties to the treaty of J 83[) nnderstDod that the Cherokees were to have a country of 1:3,800,000 acres,
for which they were to receive a patent in fee, and were to hold it all
(forever) as the white man holds his land.
In closing, allow me to indicate the conclusions that I believe are
warranted by this preRentation of the law and the factH in this ease:
Firi'lt. The question of the character of the title to what is known as
the "Cherokee Ontlet," which embraces over 6,000,000 acres of land, iR
one of vast importance, not only so far as the rights oftheUllerokees and
their moneyed interests are concerned, but also as involviHg the faith
and honor of the National HoverHment.
Se<·oud. This ofti(·e appre<'iate~ very fully the de~;irahility of extingnislling the I ll(lian title to the land in queHtion and its restoration
to the public domain in order that it may become a part of the ~rerri
tory and future State of Oklahoma, to whose progress and 11rosperity
it iR so essential, and it is only desirous that the rights of the Cherokees in the matter slmll be fully J)rotected and the national honor eonserved.
Thinl. In determinillg the question of ownerRllip to the land under
eOilRideration, the term:.;; uHed in the treaties and patent, ns we1l aR in
contemporaneous ofiieial utterances, are to be <·onstrue<l by us in the
meaning whieh was atta<'hed at the time by the Cherokee people.
I;'onrtlJ. The ''outlet" referred to by J. U. Calhoun, then Scnetary of
War, was not the "outlet" now under consideration, a]l(l <·ouRequently
his statement that the Cherokees acquired no right to the soil, but
merely an outlet, has little or no relevarwy in this diR<'ussion.
Fifth. The statement of the Secretary is referred to in the prenm hle
only, does not enter into the body of tbe treaty, and conRequeutly
forms no essential part of the grant.
Sixth. The act of May 28, 1830, authorized the President of the
United States in making excha11ges of lam.l s with Indian tribrR to assure the tribe or nation with wl1ich the exdwnge wm; to br made that
the United States would forever secure and g·narantce to them and
their heirs and successors the country so exd1anged with them, and,
if tlwy preferred it, tlmt the United States would cause a 1)atent or
grant to be made and executed for the same.
Seventh. The lands Qf the Cherokee Nation, both the "home" all(l
the "outlet," were eonveyed to that nation in excl1ange for other lands.
Eighth. We must look to the treaty of 1835, made with the Eastern
Cl1rrokees to indure them to n~move to the Western lands, rather than
to the treaties of 1828 anu 1833, for the nature and character of the grant.
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Ninth. In the negotiatiouH attending the conclusions of this treaty,
the Cherokees were solemnly assured by the President, who had the
right to make such assurance under the act of 1830, that 13,000,000
acres were destined for the permanent residence of the Eastern and
Western Cherokees, and that they would hold it by the sam~ title as
the white man holds his lands.
Tenth. The treaty of 1835 stipulated for the survey of tl1e "home"
and the "outlet" in one tract. Under this survey tlte boundaries
between the "home" and the "outlet" could not be establisl1ed, and as
a result all distinction between the "home" and the "outlet" was thel'e·
after obliterated.
Eleventl1. The sixteentl1 article of the treaty of 1866 recognized the
title of the Cherokees to all the lands in the Cherokee country. It
granted the United States the right to settle friendly Indians in any
part, not of the ''outlet," but of the Cherokee country west of the
ninety-sixth degree of longitude, which description must have included
some 2,000,000 acres of the Cherokee "home."
Twelfth. The seventeenth article of that treaty recognized the ownerRllip of the Cherokee Nation in that part of the ''outlet" lying in the
State of Kansas; under it the Cherokee Nation ceded those lands to
the United States.
Thirteenth. The courts of the United States, including the Supreme
Court, l1ave held or admitted that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands
in fee simple under patm1ts fi·om the United States.
Fonrteenth. OongTess bas repeatedly recognized the fact that all the
title to the "outlet" is vested in the Cherokee Nation.
Fif'tec11th. ~l'his fact has also been recognized by the Executive Depa rt1nents.
Sixteenth. If it be admitted that the Cherokee Nation has only an
easement or right of way over this land, it can no more be deprived of
such easement or right, lawfully, without its consent, than if it held a
fee-simple estate.
Seventeenth. Congress having recog~1ized tlw necessity of negotiatiug with the Cherokees for the relinquishment of their right, title, and
interest in and to these lands, is now estopped from asserting that the
Cherokees have no such right, tjtle, or interest as to render negotiatiom; necessary.
Jijighteenth. The right accorded the United States by the treaty of
186G to settle friendly Indians on lands west of the ninety-sixth degree
can not work an abandonment of or an easement in these huids, because the Cherokee Nation is to retain the right of possession and jurisdiction over all of said country until sold and occupied (by friendly Indians), and their jurisdiction and right of possession is to terminate
011ly as to each of the districts thus sold and occupied.
Nineteenth. While it is admitted that these lands are subject to the
right of eminent domain, such right extends only to the taking of lands
for" public use" subject to just compensation. The opening of these
lands to private entry and settlement is not such a public use.
Twentieth. If the "outlet" lands could be taken without the consent of tl1e Cherokees, it would be necessary to ascertain by aetual survey the western boundary of the 7,000,000 acres or ''home," in order
that none of these lands in which the Cherokees confessedly have all
the estate, may be opened to settlement.
Twenty-first. To make any other disposition of the "outlet" lands
tlmn that contemplated by the treaty of 1866, without the consent of
the Cherokees, would, if the foregoing conclusions are correct, be a vio-
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la6on of treaty stipulations and of the solemn pledges given by President Jackson.
Twenty-second. Congress at its last session extended the services of
the Cherokee Oommission, which bas continued the negotiations with
the Cherokee people.
These negotiations have been successful and the agreement concluded
has been ratified by the Cherokee Council, and now only awaits favorable action by Congress.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. J. MORGAN,
Commissioner.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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